WHY U S BROKERED PEACE BETWEEN CONGO AND RWANDA

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WHY U.S. BROKERED PEACE BETWEEN CONGO AND RWANDA On the 4th of July, 2025, Rwanda Kwibibana 31 or Rwanda’s 31st year of independence, Rutendo Matinyarare attended an interview at ZBC in which he was asked whether Donald Trump needed to negotiate peace between Rwanda and Congo. In his response, Rutendo explained that the process of ending the war in Congo began well before Trump got involved, when the M23 and Congo began negotiations in 2024 under a ceasefire brokered by Angola, and the East African Community force was deployed as a peacekeeping mission. In late 2024, both parties agreed to a ceasefire that saw M23 halt their advance on Goma. They stopped at the Virgins’ Breasts and Three Antenna, waiting for negotiations with Tshisekedi. But instead of negotiating, Tshisekedi requested SADC’s military intervention to fight M23. That act resumed the war, but by the end of January 2025, SADC forces had been defeated and over 2500 of their soldiers were captured. Immediately afterward, the South African government began planning to use its R10 billion war budget — enough for two years of conflict — to redeploy more troops and air support to recover their captured soldiers in Goma. Meanwhile, on the 23rd of February, 2025, Rutendo Matinyarare travelled to Goma. There, he met Congolese civilians and M23 soldiers who showed him where the battle of Goma had been fought. Armed with firsthand information, he began posting on social media, exposing that the SADC force in DRC, known as SAMIDRC, had not gone for peacekeeping as mandated by SADC. He cited Monwabisi Dyakopo’s public statement that the mission was to fight and neutralize M23 and proceed to a second enemy, widely interpreted to be Rwanda. He also exposed how SADC, Romanian mercenaries, genocidaires like FDLR, Wazalendo, and the UN had allegedly amassed massive weapons on the Rwandan border, intending to invade. Allegations also surfaced that artillery was fired into Rwanda, suggesting an attempted invasion. On the 29th of February, Rutendo posted an interview with the leader of M23, Bertrand Bisimwa, on his social media platforms. Before the day was over, while driving back to Kigali, Rutendo received a call from individuals in Zimbabwe’s security structures, stating that the Congolese government had seen his posts with M23 and wanted to know if M23 was ready to negotiate, as they now were. Rutendo responded that M23 was ready to negotiate — as long as the Congolese were serious. Deliberations were held in Harare on whether Zimbabwe should initiate a new negotiation process or support the ongoing Angolan and Kenyan-led efforts. On March 6, 2024, Tshisekedi reportedly offered Donald Trump access to Congolese minerals if he would deploy soldiers to help Congo fight M23. While Trump was still considering the proposal, on the 11th of March 2025, Angola announced that it would host talks between M23 and the DRC government on a date to be confirmed. On the 13th of March 2025, SADC met and agreed to withdraw its forces from Congo to allow space for the Congolese government and M23 to pursue peace talks. Following this, on the 18th of April 2025, SADC held a meeting with the East African Community where both parties agreed that SADC would withdraw soldiers from Goma to allow the two sides to negotiate. On the 24th of April, the two warring sides agreed to a ceasefire. So, by the 11th of March 2025, there was already consensus between M23 and the Congolese government to enter dialogue, and by the 24th of April 2025, a ceasefire was achieved — all without U.S. involvement. African regional bodies such as SADC and EAC, as well as the warring parties themselves, have not been credited adequately for facilitating this progress. However, an agreement between M23 and the Congolese government was not enough. Rwanda had its own grievances, namely that Congo continued to train, protect, and arm FDLR and its genocidaires. These forces persecuted Kinyarwandans and Banyamulenge, displacing them into Rwanda as refugees while also planning attacks on Rwanda. This remained a major issue. As long as Rwanda was still under threat from FDLR and the Congolese government, any peace agreement between M23 and DRC would be insufficient and unsustainable. Meanwhile, because the U.S. had been invited to send troops to Congo to help fight M23, Rwanda had to begin lobbying against American intervention. Such a deployment would effectively support the DRC in displacing Kinyarwandans into Rwanda and empower FDLR and the Congolese army to invade Rwandan territory — potentially destabilizing the region and risking another genocide.